This article presents data illustrating the networked structure of the water sector in two Nile Basin states, Egypt and Ethiopia. Social network analysis is applied to quantify network characteristics. Implications for water policy design and implementation processes are discussed. Governmental agencies occupy the most central network positions in both countries. Intersectoral cooperation is weak, impeding effective policy integration. The limited connectedness to nonstate actors prevents the central policy makers from tapping all available expertise and implementation capacities. International donor agencies play an important role by connecting different types of actors. The higher prominence of NGOs and decentralized water authorities in the Ethiopian water sector indicates a comparably higher potential for pluralistic policy making. Social network analysis is found to be a useful tool to highlight cooperation patterns in the water sector, but its utility for explaining policy processes without supplementary qualitative information is limited.
W ater management is an increasingly complex challenge in view of increasing population pressure, pollution problems, and projected climate change. Technical solutions often lag behind the evolving socioeconomic demands for sufficient water of good quality and at an affordable cost. Innovative societal arrangements to strengthen the efficiency of water use must be developed, and the importance of the corresponding political processes is increasingly recognized. The need for "policy harmonization" in the context of transboundary cooperation in shared river basins further complicates that task of water managers.
The framework of integrated water resources management highlights the need for demand and quality management, the importance of river basins as the appropriate planning unit, and the benefits of stakeholder participation for higher legitimacy, efficiency, and sustainability performance (Global Water Partnership, 2007) . Institutions and planning processes in the water sector reflect the extent to which a country has adopted these paradigms and potentially determine its success in formulating and implementing effective water policies.
This study applies social network analysis (SNA) as a tool for investigating water policy processes in Egypt and Ethiopia. The main goal is to present empirical network data as a means to illustrate and discuss the institutional capacity of the two countries to address water management challenges. The study addresses the question of how the structure of the water sector relates to the current priorities and water policy developments in Egypt and Ethiopia, respectively, with a special focus on the policies that are relevant for the issue of transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. A subordinate objective is to explore the utility of SNA as a tool to analyze water policy processes in the particular context of developing countries.
The countries of the Eastern Nile Basin are challenged by limited and variable availability of freshwater in relation to their current and projected future demands. Ethiopia urgently needs to make better use of its water resources to foster economic development and poverty alleviation. Egypt's almost total dependence on the Nile, however, renders upstream river water abstraction a disputed issue. In 1999, the Nile Basin states engaged in a joint effort to "achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin resources" (Nile Basin Initiative [NBI], 2007) . The NBI hosts negotiations on a new legal and institutional framework agreement and supports cooperative water development projects (e.g., Amer et al., 2005) .
Cooperative strategies in the Nile Basin can draw on the following approaches: (a) supply projects to increase the total water availability, (b) demand management to decrease the pressure on the river, and (c) transboundary cooperation to exploit comparative advantages and enhanced regional (economic) integration. These strategies relate in different ways to the domestic policies and water sector institutions and have varying underpinnings in terms of costs and benefits for domestic stakeholders. The analysis of domestic policy networks is expected to yield insights concerning domestic policy processes that also determine the outcome of the transboundary negotiations. Differences in the policy processes of the two countries (e.g., the matured and highly centralized water sector in Egypt vs. the federal and somewhat unsettled structure of the Ethiopian water sector) could be expected to result in different ways of dealing with water policy challenges.
To the authors' knowledge, this is the first instance of a quantitative network analysis methodology being applied to water sector networks in non-Western countries and in a comparative setting. Previous water policy network studies mainly focus on European countries (Bressers, O'Toole, & Richardson, 1995 ; but see also Menahem, 1998) . These studies generally find a declining prominence of traditional professional groups (i.e., engineers) and a rise of environmental actors and businesslike governance structures. Substantial differences are observed across countries in terms of private sector participation and decentralization. Budgetary pressures on governments and political advocacy by environmental pressure groups are identified as important drivers of network change.
This article first outlines the conceptual and methodological framework applied. Then, network data for the two case studies are presented. The discussion section compares the results across the case studies and discusses implications with regard to national and transboundary policy processes. The article concludes with a critical assessment of SNA as an analytical tool to illustrate water policy processes.
Conceptual Framework
Network approaches to policy analysis assume that the way policy actors are linked with each other has an effect on the design and the outcome of policies. Governments are considered not as unitary decision makers but as internally divided and as interacting with a range of actors through relatively stable, nonhierarchical linkages.
Definitions of policy networks vary greatly (e.g., Dowding, 1995; Kenis & Raab, 2003) . Some scholars refer to networks as a specific form of government, whereas others assert that networked interactions are an important feature of any type of governance system (for a distinction, see Börzel, 1998 ). This article is inclined to the latter perspective.
Policy networks can be conceptualized as a dependent or as an independent variable. Studies of the latter type address the important question of whether and how network structures affect policies and policy outcomes. The contributions of Laumann and Knoke (1987) , Marin and Mayntz (1991) , Rhodes and Marsh (1992) , Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent, and Tsujinaka (1996) , and Marsh (1998) offer particularly illustrative insights into the appearance and performance of networks in different countries and policy fields.
The effects of policy networks are often described in qualitative terms. For instance, Klijn (2003) asserted that "networks facilitate interaction, decision-making, cooperation and learning, since they provide the resources to support these activities, such as recognizable interaction patterns, common rules and organizational forms and sometimes even a common language." Marsh and Rhodes (1992) asserted that small and exclusive networks (policy communities, in contrast to broad issue networks) favor continuity of both policies and the network structures themselves. The same authors asserted that networks pursue the interests of their most dominant members. In small networks of strongly linked actors, effective social control often fosters cooperation among the members rather than competition (Coleman, 1988) .
Method
This section outlines the procedures of network delimitation, data collection, transformation, and analysis and critically assesses the quality and robustness of the collected relational data.
Organizational actors-rather than individuals-are considered as the relevant nodes in the network. The identification of network actors followed an iterative process relying on the judgment of several independent water sector experts in each country.
First, an open-ended list of organizations involved in water policy making was compiled. The actors were prioritized according to the criteria "importance in the water policy-making process" and "representation of major actor categories" (i.e., central government agencies, regional states, research organizations, private sector representatives, consulting firms, civil society representatives, and donor agencies). The number of nodes in each network was limited to around 40 for practical reasons. Major departments of both water ministries were included as separate nodes. Regional states were included only in the case of federal Ethiopia and were arbitrarily selected from the five regional states with a share of the Nile Basin. The following actor categories were not included, mainly because of the difficulty of accessing them for interviews: political leaders at the highest level, large-scale agro-investors (with the exception of a flower farmers' association in Ethiopia), foreign contractors, and financial backers from the Far East.
For most actor organizations, the relational data were collected in an interview with the head of the department mostly dealing with water issues. It is important, however, that the respondents were asked to specify the relevant network ties of their entire organization. The water ministry departments were asked to specify linkages of the department only.
Six types of linkages were assessed through a questionnaire (see Table 1 ). Interviewees were asked to specify the existence or absence of a specific type of relationship to each other actor in the network.
1 The interviewees were asked to mention only linkages with relevance to issues of water policy planning and implementation.
The influence reputation parameter is a "choice" relationship, whereas all other relation types indicate an actual interaction within a dyad (pair of actors). The frequency of meetings was assessed, yielding "valued" relationship data. The information flow linkages are "directed" and assess the existence of an information transfer from and to other actors. The effective cooperation in planning linkages are considered particularly significant in that they-by definition-relate to actual impacts of a connection on policy outcomes and are used for graphical depictions and subgroup analyses presented below.
The relational data were collected in the framework of two individual master's of science and master's of arts studies between March and July 2005 (Egypt) and March and June 2006 (Ethiopia) . The questionnaires were slightly modified in the Ethiopian case study to refine the explanatory value of the results. Accordingly, the influence reputation was assessed separately for planning and implementation processes, and joint activities were assessed instead of official affiliations. The following transformations of the raw data matrices were performed (see also • Aggregation of all water ministry departments into one single actor in each case study by adding and dichotomizing (for every network actor) the relations to and from each department. This transformation allows for a direct comparison of the network behavior of the water ministries with other ministerial actors but is valid only under the assumption of strong intraministerial connectedness. Ties of Actor A with Department X and Actor B with Department Y are reproduced as an indirect linkage between Actors A and B through the unitary water ministry in the resulting network.
• Symmetrization of binary n × n data matrices (and retaining the minimum value) to filter out nonmatching answers regarding the existence of a relationship. The absence of a tie in the resulting networks thus indicates either the absence of a relationship in reality or disagreement in the respondents' judgment. The remaining relations are confirmed by both actors and can therefore be considered as particularly significant.
• Subtraction of the two matrices with directed information flow relations (sending matrix and transposed receiving matrix) to filter out nonmatching answers. The resulting matrix is not symmetric but specifies directed information flow relations confirmed by both the sending and receiving actor.
• Categorization of meetings data; assigning values of 0, 1, 2, and 3 for no, half yearly, monthly, and biweekly or more frequent meetings; filtering out dyads in which only one actor reported joint meetings; and averaging the values in the remaining dyads. The resulting matrixes thus still contain valued data.
This article presents three types of results: (a) density and centralization indices for the entire networks, (b) centrality indices for individual actors, and (c) density values for actor categories and cohesive subgroups (e.g., Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1999) .
Density values indicate the ratio between the number of existing ties and the number of maximum possible linkages in any (sub-)network. Centralization quantifies the difference between the centrality of the most central actor and all other actors and is thus a measure of the structural heterogeneity of the network.
Centrality indicators quantify an actor's connectedness in the network but vary in terms of the weight attributed to direct and indirect linkages. The degree centrality indicates the number of an actor's direct linkages. The betweenness centrality of a Node X indicates the fraction of all dyads that are indirectly connected with the shortest connection running through Actor X.
Cohesive subgroups are network sections with particularly frequent internal linkages. This study applies the following algorithms-under varying parameters-to identify subgroups: k-plex (identifies groups in which every member is connected to all but k other members), lambda-set (identifies stable subgroups that are particularly resistant to the "removal" of a number of ties), and faction (identifies subgroups with high average tie densities).
Densities of linkages within individual actor categories or cohesive subgroups are calculated separately. Internal densities of actor categories with three or fewer actors are not shown, with one exception (multilateral donors in Egypt), because of their high sensitivity to selection bias and effects of the performed data transformations. The water ministries were not assigned to any cohesive subgroup or category to allow for a direct comparison of subnetwork density values. The densities of the entire networks (Table 2) were calculated including the water ministries, however, thus setting a somewhat higher reference point for the subnetwork densities (see Table 6 below).
The relational data were analyzed with UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) . The network graphs were produced with Visone software (Brandes & Wagner, 2004) . Note that graphical network descriptions can be misleading (Brandes, Kenis, Raab, Schneider, & Wagner, 1999; McGrath, Blythe, & Krackhardt, 1996) . It is important to note that the presented graphs do not show the overall connectedness of the water sectors but only the effective cooperation in planning ties confirmed by both respondents in each dyad.
Quality Control and Robustness of Data
The actor selection can be considered appropriate, as very few actors mentioned important ties to additional actors when explicitly asked during the interview (only the selection of bilateral donors in Ethiopia was sometimes questioned). Because the highest-level political leaders are not included, however, the presented networks better represent the linkages characterizing the design and implementation phases of water policy making, rather than the formal policy adoption step. Network data were collected from all selected network actors, yielding a complete data set. The reliability of the actors' responses was evaluated by calculating the ratio of nonmatching answers. The corresponding figures seem high at 15% to 25% but resemble values from other network studies (see Mardsen, 1990) . The discrepancies can be explained, inter alia, by (a) the considerable margin for subjective judgment in the specification of the relationships (e.g., "effective" cooperation or "relevant" information), (b) the tendency of peripheral actors to overemphasize their connectedness and of highly linked actors to omit their less important ties, and (c) strategic responses of actors trying to create a particular impression of their role in the network. The data shown in the following section, therefore, represent a somewhat subjectively painted picture of the network connectedness. This does not per se mean that the resulting network descriptions are not relevant for the analysis of policy processes but must be kept in mind when interpreting the network data. Note that the influence reputation question does not differentiate between different channels of influence (e.g., involvement in the policy formulation processes, formal veto power, regulative function, or (non-)compliance with policies) and that the respondents might thus have interpreted the influence reputation question differently.
Results
This section first compares the network indices for density and centralization across the case studies. Then, the Egyptian and Ethiopian networks are presented separately in some detail. Actor categories are grouped in Figure 2 . Abbreviations of actors' names are listed in Tables 3 and 4 . Table 2 shows the overall density and centralization values (based on degree centrality) of the Egyptian and Ethiopian water policy networks.
Network Comparison
The meetings network is slightly more dense in Ethiopia but much more centralized around the water ministry in Egypt. The information flow networks are similarly dense in both cases but slightly more centralized in Egypt. The effective cooperation networks are somewhat denser and more centralized around the water ministry in Egypt. The higher network density regarding effective cooperation in Egypt can be explained at least partly by the fact that the network relations have settled over decades, whereas the Ethiopian water sector has experienced frequent institutional changes. The higher meetings and information exchange density in Ethiopia points at the activities generated by the recently initiated water sector programs, particularly in the water supply and sanitation (WSS) subsector (e.g., through the EU Water Initiative). The federal system in Ethiopia and the relatively higher influence of nonstate actors may account for the comparably lower centralization values. 
The Egyptian Water Sector
Egypt's water demand for irrigation, industries, and domestic consumption already exceeds the supply of the Nile. The current water policy (Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation [MWRI] , 2005) aims to develop new supplies (e.g., through deep groundwater abstraction, joint "water conservation" projects in upstream countries, or seawater desalination) and to strengthen measures for demand management (e.g., through reuse, improved irrigation efficiency, cultivation of less
Figure 1 Effective Cooperation in Planning Network (Egypt)
Note: See Tables 3 and 4 for acronym definitions. The distance to the center of the graph increases with decreasing centrality of an actor. The exact length of linkages between actor pairs has no significance. Isolates (bottom right) have no confirmed ties. Table 3 Influence Reputation water-intensive crops, or import of food as "virtual water") as well as water quality control. Nontechnological demand management policies (e.g., the shift in cropping patterns toward less water-intensive crops, legal and economic regulatory instruments) seem particularly difficult to implement. Environmental provisions are not commonly enforced with priority. The diversion of water to new large-scale irrigation schemes is criticized for jeopardizing "pro-poor" development targets. The weakness of democratic institutions somewhat restricts the government's accountability concerning water policy decisions.
The political system is highly centralized around a powerful central government. Bank, 2003) . National economic policies-and particularly land reclamation targets-have a dominant effect on the design of national water management strategies. However, the shifts from supply to demand management and the current institutional reform are important endogenous drivers of policy change pursued by the water ministry.
MWRI is responsible for water resources development and allocation between different sectors as well as for the overall water quality control. The Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities (MHUNC, now renamed to Ministry of Housing and Urban Development) is in charge of WSS issues. In an attempt to foster "businesslike" water management strategies, both MWRI and the MHUNC have transferred part of their responsibilities to newly established holding companies.
The Egyptian water policy attributes allocation priority to domestic and industrial water uses. This renders the agricultural sector particularly susceptible to changes in the overall water availability. The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MoALR) regulates agricultural production in both the "old" lands and in modern irrigation schemes on newly reclaimed areas. The Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) and the industrial sector represented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) have diverging interests regarding the enforcement of stringent legislation for pollution control. Environmental interests are represented by the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MoSEA, incorporating the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency).
Different water consumers and polluters (e.g., private and state-owned industries, agricultural investors, and small-scale water users) have unequal access to the policy process and often rely on informal linkages. Civil society groups are rather weak in terms of popular support and access to key political resources. Dissatisfaction with water policies or water sector performance is sometimes raised in parliament or expressed in public protests. Stakeholder platforms such as the Egyptian Water Partnership are a relatively new network element. (Tables 3 and 4) and centrality values (Figure 2) as indicators of the relative influence of actors in the water sector. Figure 1 illustrates the effective cooperation in planning network under specification of the MWRI departments.
Network results. This section discusses the influence reputation
It is not surprising that the water ministry emerges as the most influential actor in the Egyptian water sector. The National Water Research Center (affiliated with MWRI), the Minister's Office, the Planning Sector, and the large Irrigation Department occupy central positions in the effective cooperation in planning network and receive high influence reputation scores. The limited external connectedness and the low influence reputation of the MWRI's Water Quality Unit are illustrative of the difficulties of establishing effective institutional capacity in a relatively new policy domain.
Beside the MWRI, the ministries in charge of agriculture (MoALR) and domestic water supply (MHUNC) receive the highest influence reputation scores. Their centrality values are also high but range in the same level of magnitude as the most prominent nonstate actors.
The fact that the MoALR has effective cooperation ties to different MWRI departments, but not to other ministries, indicates that the issue of irrigation development-and intersectoral water allocation in general-is hardly subject to a fully integrated interministerial planning process. Rather, sectoral demands are compiled and balanced by the MWRI in the light of national development targets.
The Potable Water and Sanitation Holding Company receives relatively numerous influence reputation votes and also occupies a central position in the implementation network. In contrast, the holding companies in charge of administering the newly reclaimed agricultural lands (represented by the North Sinai HC) do not appear to have developed a strong independent profile.
The high centrality of the environmental ministry is interesting, as no effective cooperation relations to any MWRI departments are reported (only meeting relations). The MoSEA also ranges below the MoALR and the MHUNC in the influence reputation score. This could mean two things. Either the environmental sector cannot (yet) sufficiently exploit its frequent linkages to effectively influence water policies or the majority of respondents fail to see the considerable influence (i.e., in terms of issuing environmental legislation) of this relatively new actor. Both explanations probably apply to some extent.
The centrality of the ministry in charge of industrial development (MoTI) is low, even compared to its moderate influence reputation score. Industries seem to gain their influence not from participating in water policy making but rather from their ability to resist the enforcement of stringent water quality standards. The isolated position of the MoTI and the peripheral position of the MoHP are indicative of the laborious interministerial process to reform the legislation regarding waste water quality.
254 Table 4 Influence Reputation of Water Ministry Departments The Ministry of Planning (MoP; now integrated in the Ministry of Economic Development) receives relatively few influence reputation votes. This corresponds with qualitative statements to the effect that the MoP compiles sectoral policies rather than integrating them and trading them off against each other, much in contrast to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) in Ethiopia (see below).
The most important donor agencies according to the influence reputation measures are the World Bank, USAID, and the Netherlands Development Cooperation Division (Dutch Embassy). USAID, however, has recently phased out its water policy support project, which explains its somewhat lower centrality values. Donors are connected to the MWRI-in an effective cooperation sense-both through the departments in charge of water policy formulation (Minister's Office, Planning Department) and through operational departments and water projects. The highly central role of several donor agencies in the information exchange network is noteworthy and is likely to contribute to the donors' considerable influence in addition to their expertise and financial resources.
The Egyptian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage (ENCID) and the Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE) are the most influential NGOs in terms of influence reputation. ENCID, however, has tight institutional and personnel linkages to MWRI. CEDARE's high influence reputation score can be partly attributed to the Egyptian Water Partnership, which it hosts. The Arab Office for Youth and Environment, as the most independent NGO represented in the presented network, has a low influence reputation score and maintains no direct effective cooperation linkages to the MWRI.
Nonministerial research institutions are only peripherally linked in the Egyptian water sector. Effective cooperation linkages with individual operational departments of MWRI are reported, but it is surprising that no links to the National Water Research Center are reported. In contrast to the Ethiopian case study, consulting firms play a marginal role, which points to the high expertise and ownership of the policy process on the part of the MWRI.
The parliament receives a high number of influence reputation votes but is poorly connected in the network. The parliament hosts controversial debates on specific water-related issues (e.g., land reclamation projects, water quality, and pricing policies), but the ruling party's solid majority makes the legislature an unlikely veto player in the design of water sector strategies, at least with regard to general policy directions. The high influence reputation score may thus partly reflect the formal rather than the actually exerted influence of the parliament.
The high influence reputation score of water user associations (WUAs; including Water Boards) is interesting given their local character, their relatively brief history, and their low connectedness in the network. Water users commonly exercise influence by complying-or not-with government policies (e.g., the restriction on rice cultivation or groundwater use) rather than through direct involvement in the policy processes. WUAs and Water Boards are expected to play a more important role in the future according to the ongoing institutional reform process, which may account for their prominence in the influence reputation ranking.
It is important to note that both the parliament and the WUAs are special network actors in this study. The fact that they do not commonly interact with other network actors as a collective entity, but rather through individual MPs and specialized committees or individual WUAs, respectively, somewhat defies the inclusion of the "parliament" and "WUAs" as unitary nodes in the network. This can partly explain the discrepancy between influence reputation and centrality scores of these actors. Table 5 lists actor categories and the cohesive subgroups identified in the subgroup analysis (based on the effective cooperation in planning networks). Two distinct cohesive subgroups were found in the Egyptian case study. One seems to deal mainly with WSS issues, whereas the other mainly comprises actors concerned with irrigation policy. The MWRI and the World Bank are represented in both subgroups. Table 6 shows average densities in each actor category and subgroup and compares these values to the overall network densities for each linkage type. Note that differences between the categories of governmental actors are not directly comparable across the two case studies, as the numbers of ministerial actors differ significantly (10 in Egypt and 6 in Ethiopia).
Direct (i.e., not mediated through the water ministries) linkages related to water policy issues are infrequent within the category of ministerial actors, especially in terms of effective cooperation. This indicates that the task of water policy integration is still primarily performed by the MWRI rather than by the ministerial actors as a group.
Donors have frequent ties with each other in terms of meetings and information exchange. These linkages, however, only partly translate into effective cooperation ties regarding policy formulation and implementation. This seems to confirm qualitative findings that donors in Egypt-unlike in Ethiopia-mainly influence water policies through individual projects rather than jointly through the national and sectoral planning processes.
The internal tie densities in the two cohesive subgroups are similar and tend to be higher than internal tie densities of the actor categories, particularly for effective cooperation linkages. Subgroup 1 (WSS) seems to be somewhat more closely connected through meetings and affiliations, whereas information exchange and effective cooperation are more pronounced within Subgroup 2 (irrigation). These differences may partly reflect the long institutional history of the irrigation subsector and the recently strengthened programs to improve drinking water and sanitation coverage in the context of the Millennium Development Goals.
The Ethiopian Water Sector
High rainfall variability and limited access to water services are the main challenges to water policy making in Ethiopia. Poverty alleviation and food security-sometimes understood in a narrow sense of food self-sufficiency-are overarching national planning priorities. The goal of increased agricultural production is pursued by means of large-scale and small-scale irrigation expansion as well as by strengthening rain-fed agriculture (Ministry of Water Resources [MoWR], 1999 [MoWR], , 2002 . Substantial donor-supported initiatives in the fields of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene have been launched in recent years. Hydropower development has also received increasing attention.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper documents formulated by MoFED in partnership with donor agencies are key planning instruments that guide all sectoral policies. The comprehensive design of the Ethiopian water policy contrasts with a more fragmented implementation process. Strategies giving priority to household-centered rural development are increasingly rivaled by large-scale approaches targeting commercial agriculture, hydropower export, and national economic growth. The accountability of water sector planning is rather low, especially at the Table 3 for acronym definitions. The densities of cohesive subgroups in Table 6 are calculated without the water ministries. Table 6 Subnetwork national level, where decisions regarding large-scale infrastructure projects are made. More information on the Ethiopian water sector is provided by, for example, Rahmato (1999), Arsano (2004), and UNESCO (2004) . MoWR is in charge of formulating water policies, issuing regulations and standards, and implementing large-scale water development projects. Forced regime changes in 1974 and 1991 and a high staff turnover have disrupted planning processes and dispersed water sector expertise. The limited planning capacity forces the MoWR to rely on consulting firms for many important steps of the policy design process. The Water Works Design & Supervision Enterprise, a MoWR spin-off, is particularly important in this context.
The mandates of different federal ministries regarding water management are still partly unsettled or unclear. This has caused friction between the MoWR and other government agencies, regarding, for example, the lead responsibility for small-scale irrigation (with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; MoARD), dam construction (with the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation; EEPCo), or sanitation issues (with the Ministry of Health; MoH).
Regional state governments enjoy substantial decision-making power in Ethiopia. Regional water and/or agricultural bureaus are charged with the provision of water services and the design of small-scale water development projects. Efforts to further empower zones, woredas (districts), and local water user groups face substantial constraints in terms of trained manpower, financial resources, and regulatory frameworks.
International donor agencies and NGOs have established a strong presence in Ethiopia, particularly since 1991. Donors coordinate their activities through the Development Assistance Group and through their involvement in the national planning process.
NGOs engaged in the water sector include international, domestic (national and regional state levels), and faith-based groups. International NGOs generally enjoy greater privileges, in terms of both their financial capacity and their independence from government control. Numerous NGOs coordinate their activities through the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA).
Water research is mainly conducted at universities and at the regional office of the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). Representatives of the private sector still have a relatively low profile in the water sector. Agro-investors, for example, in the successful flower farming industry, are likely to play a more important role in the future.
Network results. The top position in the influence reputation ranking is taken by the MoWR (Table 3) . It is interesting that the influential MoWR departments (Table 4) charged with strategic planning tasks-that is, the Planning, Policy, and Basin Studies Departments-have no confirmed effective cooperation in planning linkages to the state agencies responsible for agriculture (MoARD), health (MoH), or hydropower development (EEPCo). This is indicative of the water sector's limited capacity to effectively coordinate and integrate trans-sectoral policy issues (see Figure 3) .
Among the operational MoWR departments, the Urban and Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Departments have the highest number of linkages to external actors, particularly MoH, regional states, and donor agencies. This corresponds to the high levels of interactions because of the recently launched and donor-supported initiatives to boost the WSS coverage. The relatively low influence reputation rank of the Dams Design and Construction Department indicates that the decisions regarding the implementation of dam projects are influenced by other key actors, for example, the Basin Studies Department in charge of the River Basin Master Plans, the EEPCo, and the MoFED.
MoARD, in charge of coordinating small-scale irrigation developments at national level, is considered to be very influential. The absence of confirmed linkages between MoARD and MoWR's Irrigation Department, in terms of effective cooperation and other types of relations, is indicative of the above-mentioned lack of interministerial coordination. The high influence reputation rank of the MoFED corresponds with its key role in the overall national planning processes. Both the MoARD and the MoFED have relatively low centrality values, indicating that these agencies derive their influence from their formal power and access to political resources rather than by means of their network performance.
The relatively high influence reputation scores of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contrast with its low centrality values, particularly regarding effective cooperation, and the observation that environmental issues are often marginalized during the implementation of water development projects. The high influence reputation score may thus mainly relate to the EPA's regulative function and veto power concerning water development projects, which is expected to gain relevance in the future.
The influence reputation score of the parliament is lower in Ethiopia as compared to Egypt but still significant considering the low respective centrality indices. As in Egypt, interference by the legislature is considered a minor constraint in national water policy processes.
Regional state authorities are considered influential in the design but even more so in the implementation of water policies. Regional state water bureaus have effective cooperation linkages to MoWR departments and national ministries but lack direct linkages with each other (except meetings). Differences between the network positions of regional states must be interpreted carefully, however, as the actual mandates of different water bureaus differ somewhat.
Multilateral donors are considered influential, particularly the World Bank, UNICEF, and the African Development Bank. Bilateral donors seem to play a comparatively marginal role in the planning and-the Japanese Development Cooperation Agency being an exception-the implementation of water sector strategies. The World Bank, UNICEF, and UNDP are also among the most central donors in the network. The World Bank is particularly central from a betweenness point of view; that is, it links different sets of actors that otherwise have few linkages.
Among the NGOs, only WaterAid (an international NGO) and the umbrella organization CRDA reach intermediate influence reputation scores with regard to water sector planning. WaterAid in particular seems to derive its influence partly from its relatively high connectedness in the network. Other NGOs are considered influential regarding implementation to some degree and maintain effective cooperation in implementation linkages to regional state authorities, MoWR, and donor agencies.
Consulting firms have effective cooperation linkages to the MoWR's top management and numerous meetings and joint activities linkages to many MoWR departments as well as regional state authorities and NGOs. Their relatively central network position is reflected in fairly high influence reputation scores.
The Chamber of Commerce and the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association have very low influence reputation and centrality values. This might to some degree reflect the fact that private sector representatives have only recently emerged to articulate claims for water services and corresponds to the informal nature of their interactions with other water sector actors. A more detailed study involving a larger sample of private sector actors would be required to adequately describe the dynamics and the network connectedness of the private sector.
Research institutions are linked to the water sector mainly through the Research Department of the MoWR, which is well connected but not considered to be very influential. IWMI is the most frequently mentioned research institution with regard to influence reputation and also achieves the highest centrality values.
Linkage densities in the category of ministerial actors (excluding the MoWR) are below average, except for the information flow network (Table 6 ). The category of multilateral donors shows the highest degree of internal connectivity regarding meetings, information exchange, and also effective cooperation ties. Cooperation among NGOs is strong in terms of meetings, information exchange, and joint activities. These ties seem to translate at least partly into effective cooperation in implementation but less so in planning.
The search for stable cohesive subgroups in the Ethiopian water policy network yielded only one reproducible subgroup, which mainly consists of actors engaged in WSS activities (Table 5 ). The absence of tightly linked subgroups in the irrigation and hydropower subsectors may partly relate to the frequent institutional reforms and the interministerial competition regarding certain water policy issues.
Summary and Discussion
This section relates the key results of the network analysis to the characteristics and outcomes of water policy processes at both the domestic and transboundary levels. Table 7 summarizes the main network characteristic in the two case studies.
The network structures identified in this study can be linked to specific patterns of water policy planning and implementation that influence both the domestic water policy outcomes and the countries' ability to harmonize their water policies in a basinwide cooperative framework. It is important to note, however, that network structures can only partly explain policy outcomes and that the particular political context, socioeconomic factors, and personal perceptions of political leaders also significantly influence water policy decisions.
The water policy networks in Egypt and Ethiopia partly reflect the general paradigm shifts regarding water management in these countries, as indicated by the presence of environmental actors and-to a lesser extent-representatives of civil society, the private sector, and decentralized stakeholder groups. In contrast to the water policy networks studied by Bressers et al. (1995) , societal movements are not (yet) important as drivers of network change in Egypt and Ethiopia. Endogenous institutional reforms, donor conditionalities, and budgetary pressures are more important. The dynamics of water policy processes in both countries largely depend on the cooperation and competition between the centrally placed government agencies. (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998 ) types of policy networks. As such, the networks and resulting policies can be expected to be rather reluctant to change . Intersectoral competition, however, also prevents the formation of a tightly linked and effectively collaborating policy community regarding water policy in each country.
The weak and conflictive interministerial linkages correspond to rather fragmented planning processes and a limited ability of water policy makers to evaluate and exploit trade-offs between different water uses and related policy options. Attempts to improve intergovernmental coordination, for example, through the establishment of joint committees, have proven difficult in both countries. The coordinative role of the MoFED in Ethiopia only partly compensates for the weakness of direct intersectoral linkages. Lack of coordination particularly affects the design of policies to address trans-sectoral issues such as demand and quality management. The fruitless attempts to amend cropping patterns and enforce waste water standards in Egypt can partly be explained by a lack of intersectoral collaboration. Failure of demand management strategies strengthens those stakeholders in the water sector who are most interested in conventional approaches, that is, infrastructure projects to enhance the total water supply.
Structural underrepresentation of water users and advocacy groups decreases the governments' accountability with regard to pro-poor development targets and environmental conservation and thus also favors the adoption of large-scale infrastructure projects in both countries (land reclamation, river diversion, large-scale dams).
Because of the higher budgetary dependence of the Ethiopian government, the influence of donor agencies is comparably higher in this country as compared to Egypt. The central role of foreign donors constitutes a special type of policy network. Donors are part of the restricted network cores and at the same time explicitly claim to foster pluralistic policy making. This creates new entry points for nonstate actors to engage in policy processes. Newly emerging policy issues are more likely to be handled through less stable but more inclusive subnetworks, for example, quality and demand management (both countries) or watershed management and rainwater harvesting (mainly in Ethiopia). It is hoped that more effective coordination among donor agencies will further strengthen their integrative effect on water policy making.
Decentralization of the water policy network poses a major structural challenge to the central government's decision autonomy in Ethiopia. The progressive empowerment of decentralized water authorities significantly changes the terms for the adoption and implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects. The trade-off between the rights of decentralized groups to self-determination and the government's room to maneuver in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects thus affects both domestic water development and the Nile Basin negotiations.
It is interesting that the seemingly more pluralistic water policy network in Ethiopia-with independent NGOs, decentralized water authorities, and donors in central positions-does not seem to translate into significantly more integrated water policy processes and more effective water policies as compared to the Egyptian case study. NGOs and foreign donors in Ethiopia claim that they have sharpened the government's attention to environmental protection and to issues of sanitation or rainwater harvesting. These issues, however, are pursued no less prominently in the less pluralistic Egyptian water sector. The higher research and planning capacity on the part of the Egyptian water ministry apparently compensates for the water sector's lack of linkages to nongovernmental sources of expertise.
Many water sector representatives expect the NBI to catalyze the joint implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects to regulate the flow and increase the total availability of river water in the basin. Although the dominant network positions of central governmental actors decrease the risk of "interference" from domestic actors in the design of transboundary agreements and projects, the lack of legitimacy and the weak integration of peripheral stakeholders' interests put any topdown water development at risk of implementation failure. The Nile states will hardly be able to exploit maximum benefits from transboundary cooperation without broadening their water policy networks to design and "societally ratify" integrated domestic water management strategies. The growing number and prominence of stakeholder platforms in both countries is expected to have a positive effect on the comprehensiveness of water policies. Donors can play a supportive role in this context and exploit their prominent positions in both countries to foster the adoption of more internationally compatible water development and management strategies.
Conclusions
The analysis of network structures can be helpful for explaining policy processes and outcomes in a given water sector, particularly in complement to and in support of qualitative studies. Quantitative network results can help to identify and illustrate structural constraints in water policy processes and can contribute to the design of institutional reforms in the water sector.
The application of SNA as a method developed mainly in the "Northern" academic context produced viable data when applied to policy networks in two developing countries. Special attention has to be paid, however, to the particularities of policy processes in specific political contexts when interpreting and comparing network data. Although some particularities of policy processes in developing countries are reflected in the networks (e.g., the role of donors), others (e.g., the independence and influence of NGOs) must be interpreted in a context-sensitive manner.
The identification of clear correlations between network structures and policy outcomes in this study is somewhat constrained by the relative similarity of the two government-dominated water policy networks. Another constraint to the explanatory 266 The Journal of Environment & Development power of the presented network parameters results from the overlap of different water policy subfields (e.g., WSS, irrigation, hydropower), which somewhat blurs the picture of which linkages are relevant for which specific water policy decisions.
A more refined approach could analyze the subnetworks in different water policy subfields separately but should not neglect the structural linkages and trade-offs between these subsectors. Including more nodes in the network (by both including more actors and considering the internal structure of regional authorities and national ministries) would yield a more comprehensive picture and better represent peripheral players, particularly from the private sector.
Alternative methods to quantify network linkages could be used in addition to the respondents' own assessments of their network relations, for example, the analysis of co-participation in key policy events (two-mode network analysis; e.g., Wasserman & Faust, 1999) . This would also be useful to better distinguish subnetworks related to specific channels of influence (e.g., regulation, direct involvement in policy design, or (non-)compliance).
The different relationship types distinguished in this study (i.e., affiliations, joint activities, meetings, information exchange, and effective cooperation) yielded fairly similar centrality patterns, and their number could be reduced without a significant loss of explanatory power. The distinction between an "objective" (e.g., meetings) and a subjectively evaluated type of linkage (e.g., effective cooperation), however, can yield valuable insights.
Methodological refinements require significantly greater time investments and/or complicate the questionnaires. The utility of applying SNA for the analysis of water sector processes ultimately depends on the required inputs in terms of time and human resources, particularly in view of the fact that quantitative network data can only complement and refine, but not replace, a qualitative analysis of policies and water sector institutions.
Note
1. The questionnaires are available from the corresponding author on request.
